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Securing the communication between a web server and a
browser is a fundamental task of securing the World Wide
Web. Websites today rely heavily on HTTPS to set up secure
connections. In recent years, several incidents undermined
this trust and therefore the security of the HTTPS system.
In this paper we introduce an approach allowing to secure
JavaScript files in case a HTTPS connection between web
server and browser is compromised. Our paper presents a
solution to safeguard the user’s browser so that it only pro-
cesses content (e.g., JavaScript or HTML) that was genuinely
provided by the web application service providers them-
selves. Our solution makes use of service workers, a recently
proposedW3CCandidate Recommendation enabling applica-
tions to take advantage of persistent background processing,
including hooks to enable bootstrapping of web applications
while offline. It demonstrates how service workers are able
to validate the integrity of JavaScript files within the client’s
browser and how service workers are used to detect and
mitigate malicious JavaScript files.
CCS CONCEPTS
• Security and privacy→Web application security; Browser
security; Intrusion detection systems.
1 INTRODUCTION
Transport Layer Security (TLS) allows to encrypt and secure
data traffic between two parties in a computer network. It is
widely used in the World Wide Web (WWW) as part of the
Hyper Text Transfer Protocol Secure (HTTPS) to protect traf-
fic between web browsers and web servers. It is touted as one
of the most common data transmission security mechanism
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used today, and its newest version 1.3 is considered state-of-
the-art in digital communication protection. But even though
TLS is considered highly secure in regard to its underlying
cryptographic primitives and protocols, it has one notable
weakness in the way it is applied in common web browsers:
Its dependency on a Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) based
on Certificate Authorities (CAs).
Browsers and operating systems come with a prepack-
aged set of trusted CA certificates. When a web browser
instantiates a TLS connection to a web server, it has to check
whether the X.509 certificate issued to and provided by the
web server is valid. One important step to check the validity
of the certificate is checking whether it was signed by one
of the prepackaged trusted CAs (if not removed by the user).
For instance, the Mozilla Firefox browser comes with a
prepackaged list of about 150 trusted Root CAs [1] that in
turn can deploy and authorize intermediate CAs, which in
the end will sign the certificates used for TLS. The weakness
in this system comes from the fact, that if any of the 150
Root CAs or any of the many more intermediate CAs gets
compromised, an attacker might be able to forge a valid
certificate for an arbitrary chosen domain.
If this happens, a man-in-the-middle attack becomes fea-
sible for the holder of the forged certificate and as conse-
quence, all transferred data can be read and manipulated by
an attacker at will.
In the case of a web application, this even means that an
attacker can hijack an ongoing user session and execute ar-
bitrarily operations within the web application in the user’s
name. Depending on the web application this may for in-
stance lead to financial or reputational loss for the service
provider and/or user. As provider or user, one therefore has
to not only to trust in the proper operation of modern cryp-
tography (i.e., a working TLS connection) but also in the
capabilities and security of hundreds of companies, their IT
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systems and thousands of their employees all around the
world.
Multiple well-documented incidents where attackers were
able to gain illegitimate certificates have already occurred [6,
15]. One of the most notorious incidents involved the CA
DigiNotar, which issued a fraudulent wildcard certificate
for Google that was later used in a man-in-the-middle at-
tack [13]. Additionally, surveillance disclosures, brought into
motion by ex-NSA contractor Edward Snowden in 2013, indi-
cate that certain organizations might be able to break or
circumvent TLS in yet undisclosed ways [8]. Sloppy CA
processes, malicious actors, installed weak root certificates
(e.g., [3], [10]), TLS stripping, or just careless users ignoring
browser warnings for questionable certificates, can as well
lead to successful man-in-the-middle attacks.
In this paper, we present a new approach to address such
attacks with the help of a component available in virtually all
modern browser by default— service workers. We show how
it can be leveraged to set up an additional authenticated en-
cryption layer on top of HTTPSwhich can be implemented in
plain JavaScript. The fundamental challenge to be addressed
here is the delivery mechanisms of the JavaScript code, as all
JavaScript code that is run on the client’s browser is delivered
over a HTTPS connection (chicken-and-egg-problem).
This leads to the problem, that a man-in-the-middle could
modify the JavaScript files in transit and disable the JavaScript
encryption. As consequence, any additional layer of encryp-
tion is only effective if it is tamper resistant against modifi-
cations by a man-in-the-middle.
This example highlights that there are two problemswhich
need to be solved in order to establish a trusted layer of en-
cryption in JavaScript over a HTTPS connection that might
have been intercepted using a rogue certificate:
(1) Exchanging encryption keys over an insecure HTTPS
connection, assuming that an attacker is listening to
the communication.
(2) Delivering JavaScript that is cryptographically proven
to not have been modified by a man-in-the-middle.
In general, these problems can be tackled in two different
ways. We can either distribute a trusted component within
the browser over another channel, which is believed to be
resistant to man-in-the-middle attack, or we can set up a
trust on first use (TOFU) system.
Our solution proposes a TOFU system which allows to
solve the mentioned problems by using service workers. No
user interaction is required to get this solution up and run-
ning, since service workers are widely supported by most
browsers today [2] and used in web sites all over the world.
We will show that service workers, once installed, can be
used to prevent man-in-the-middle attacks from powerful
adversaries with rogue certificates.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Sec-
tion 2 discusses alternative approaches to solving the prob-
lem. In Section 3, we provide more details on the attack
scenario considered in this paper. Section 4 and 5 introduce
the basic principles of service workers and how we use them
as security measure. Section 6 describe a implementation
example and shows how incidents can be handle in practise.
The setup and evaluation methodology for our evalua-
tion is presented in Section 7 and the corresponding results
in Section 8. The paper is concluded with a discussion of
limitations in Section 9 and an outlook in Section 10.
2 RELATEDWORK
The shortcomings in CA PKI lead to the situation that even
with two uncompromised endpoints, there might be the pos-
sibility of a man-in-the-middle attack tapping into the con-
nection. Various efforts to counter this kind of attacks on
HTTPS have been conducted in the past, resulting in mech-
anisms and protocols such as HTTP Public Key Pinning
(HPKP) [7], DNS-based Authentication of Named Entities
(DANE) [11] or Certificate Transparency (CT) [5]. HPKP is
considered deprecated since version 69 of Chrome due to
having dangerous side effects [12] and DANE has no major
browser support. At the time of writing only CT is considered
a state-of-the-art mechanism and it is widely deployed.
Certificate Transparency ensures that issued certificates
by CAs are logged and can be monitored and audited. In
order to ensure that no rogue certificates are issued, CAs and
domain owners have to monitor the CT logs continuously.
In short, with CT it is possible to retrospectively detect that
a rogue certificate was issued, but CT alone does not prevent
the attack.
Further actions by the CA and the domain owner have to
be taken in order to mitigate the attack. The CA and domain
owners have to detect the attack and revoke the rogue cer-
tificate. The revocation can take some time which may allow
the attacker to do financial or reputational damage.
3 ATTACK SCENARIOS
The main attack scenario against which we evaluated our
approach was a man-in-the-middle attack on TLS with a
certificate accepted by the browser.
We further distinguish between passive and active man-
in-the-middle attacks. In a passive man-in-the-middle attack,
the attacker is able to read all transferred data in cleart-
ext without interfering with the traffic. In an active man-
in-the-middle attack, the attacker is additionally able to in-
ject and/or manipulate any transmitted content. Both kinds,
active and passive, are assumed to be undetectable by the
browser or the web server (in absence of additional counter-
measures).
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Starting from the premise that the cryptographic primi-
tives of TLS themselves withstand the attempt to accomplish
a successful man-in-the-middle attack, it is required for the
attacker to be in possession of a private key, matching a
X.509 certificate that the victims browser accepts. This can
happen in the following scenarios:
• A genuine CA issues a certificate for the concerning
domain (by either cheating or forcing (e.g., as state
actor) the CA to comply).
• The attacker steals the private key for a valid CA cer-
tificate (e.g., by exploiting a weakness in the CA’s IT
infrastructure).
• The attacker steals the private key for a genuine cer-
tificate of the concerning domain (e.g., by exploiting a
weakness in a web server).
• The attacker exploits an installed weak non-standard
CA certificate (installed, e.g., due to company-policy,
anti-virus software, malware, etc.).
On a technical level it is irrelevant which of these scenarios
happens, in every case, the connection has to be considered
insecure i.e., privacy, authenticity and integrity provided by
TLS, can not be taken for granted.
Additionally, the timing of an attack is considered. We
define three possible timing scenarios:
(A) An attack is conducted from the beginning of the TLS
handshake. In this scenario the user has never visited
the domain before and an attacker can tamper the
connection from the first moment in time (from the
first byte) when the browser attempts a connection to
the domain.
(B) The client has already visited a domain once (without
a man-in-the-middle attack). The attacker can tamper
the connection from the first moment in time of the
second connection to the same domain.
(C) In the third scenario, the TLS connection between the
endpoints have already been established and the do-
main has been visited more than once by the client.
An attacker modifies or intercepts content during an
active TLS connection.
4 SERVICE WORKERS
Service workers are part of the HTML Living Standard [9].
They are specified in a W3C Editor’s Draft [14] which is
under development at the time of writing. Service workers
were introduced in Chrome and Mozilla Firefox in 2015, with
Safari following in 2018. They are now supported and en-
abled by default in the browsers of around 90% of all desktop
users. The availability in browsers for mobile users is even
higher [2].
Similar to browser plugins, service workers can act as a
proxy-like entity between the web server and the regular
runtime of the user‘s browser. In contrast to browser plugins,
service workers do not need to be installed manually by the
user. Originally they were introduced as a way to provide a
better user experience when in case of temporary network
outages. In such scenario, the service worker can answer
the browser requests with cached or self-generated content,
instead of an actual web server response. With this, it is
for example possible to fully operate a web-based e-mail
client when offline. In this case the user can search, read
and even answer e-mails that were cached within a service
worker in advance. Pending in- and outgoing messages can
be processed at a later point in time when the network is
available again.
Understanding the life cycle of service workers is a crucial
precondition when implementing a security solution utiliz-
ing them. In the following paragraphs, we first present the
basic life cycle of a service worker given by W3C Editor’s
Draft [14] and then take a closer look at some important
corner cases that are relevant for our approach.
Parsed: Before we can make use of a service worker, it has
to be registered, installed and activated. A service worker is
always registered for a certain scope. The scope can either be
the whole domain (e.g., https://example.com/) or a sub-path
(e.g., https://example.com/sub/). Only one service worker
can be active at any given time. If a second service worker
is registered or a new version is made available, the current
one is halted and replaced. The individual steps take place
as follows:
Installing: The registration process can be initiated with
the following code in one of the regular loaded JavaScripts:
navigator.serviceWorker.register(‘sw.js’). The browserwill then
request the service worker (defined in this example in sw.js)
from the web server, whereupon it will be registered, in-
stalled and cached (as described in the following points). This
process will only succeed if the service worker is served over
TLS, otherwise the installation is rejected by the browser
as stated in [14]. Serving the service worker over TLS is a
security measure enforced by the browser to prevent the
installation of a tampered service worker through an inse-
cure connection. As an important limitation, at this point,
we still have to trust that TLS will work properly, and that
no active man-in-the-middle attack is ongoing. This means
the installation of a service worker relies on the fact that at
installation time no active man-in-the-middle attack is con-
ducted. This trust on first use problem is further discussed
in Section 9.1.
Once the browser receives the service worker, a separate
thread will start in the browser that will execute it. During
this phase an install event can spawn functions to perform
arbitrary tasks, like pre-caching of static web application
assets.
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Figure 1: Service workers state diagram.
From the moment the service worker is installed, it can be
seen as a kind of short-lived standalone extension within the
browser. Most importantly, it has its own states and lifetime
which are independent of the displayed browser window.
After a successful installation, the service worker changes
from the installing into the active state (see Figure 1). An
activate event is fired at this point. Note that the service
worker still has to claim the web page.
Waiting: After a service worker is installed, it does not
get active immediately. In case that another service worker
is already installed it goes into the waiting state until the old
service worker can be replaced. This happens either when
the page is revisited by the user or when the new service
worker uses clients.claim(). With clients.claim(), the service
worker can skip the waiting time using the skipWaiting()
method. In this case, the service worker replaces the old one
immediately after its install routine returns successfully.
Active: In this state the service worker is installed and
active, but does not operate as one might expect; it does
not intercept any requests yet. For consistency reasons, a
service worker usually only reacts to requests originating
from web pages which were loaded through the respective
service worker. This means all windows of that website must
be closed and the users has to revisit it again at a later point
in time.1 On this second visit, the service worker claims
the page even before the first web request to the domain
is made. This means from this point on it can intercept all
requests/responses to and from the website.
The service worker can react to the activate event and can
then call clients.claim(). This will lead to the desired situa-
tion where the service worker gets control over submitted
requests and responses. Note that all of this happens asyn-
chronously, so there are no guarantees when exactly the
page gets claimed by the service worker.
Idle: Once fully active, the service worker can listen to re-
quests in the form of fetch events coming from the respective
web page [14]. It can take full control of a request by call-
ing event.respondWith() on the respective event. The service
worker can now forward, manipulate or dismiss the request.
When it receives a response from the web server, it can once
1A force reload to ignore cached content will yield the same result.
again freely forward, manipulate or dismiss this response. It
therefore acts now like a proxy server in between the regular
part of the browser and the website.
Updating: From time to time a service worker has to be
updated. For instance, to interact with new features on the
website or to fix bugs in the existing code. The browser will
check regularly whether the service worker script specified
during the registration has changed. If the newly fetched
script is byte-different to the already installed one, the new
one is seen as an updated version and will be installed. The
time interval in which the browser checks for an updated ser-
vice worker can vary, depending on settings like the update-
ViaCache parameter during the registration and the Cache-
Control: max-age HTTP header.
It can be set to check on every navigation event on the
registered scope, but it can also be postponed to an interval
of maximal 24 hours. This means, the browser will swap an
already running worker for a new version after a day, in
case one is available. If no new service worker is available
the service worker will stay within the browser as long as
the user does not deleted it. The upper limit of 24 hours
is meant as a security measure, to prevent that a bug in a
service worker could make the website unusable for the user.
In this case, a repaired version of the service worker gets
installed on the user’s computer no later than a day. Once
the old service worker is replaced, the updated one will start
to receive all fetch events for the registered scope. It will
behave like a newly installed one as described before.
5 INTEGRITY VALIDATION
The capabilities of services workers are not limited to answer
failed requests in the case of a network outage. They can
in principle intercept any kind of request and answer them
with an arbitrary response created by the service worker.
They can also initiate their own requests and do all kinds of
processing, as service workers are just regular instances of
independently running JavaScript code.
Figure 2 shows an overview of our approach. Service work-
ers are used to detect manipulations of received web content
and to seize appropriate measures once a manipulation is de-
tected. We achieve this by integrating digital signatures into
the header of all HTTP responses sent by the TLS endpoint.
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Figure 2: Integrity validation with service workers.
These signatures can be used by the service worker to verify
the integrity of response bodies (e.g., containing JavaScript,
HTML or other content).
The first step 1 in Figure 2 represents a HTTPS request by
a client browser to a specific domain. As shown in Figure 2
the request is sent over an unknown and untrusted network
to the web applications uplink 2 . Such an uplink can for
instance be a load balancer or web application firewall which
then forwards the request to a specific web server.
Depending on the network infrastructure either the web
server 3 or the uplink will then add a signature to the HTTP
header, which is later used within the service worker for
the integrity validation. The signature is generated with a
private key over the HTTPS response body. Appending the
signatures happens ideally on an upstream system which is
less exposed to attacks than the web server. If an upstream
system is not an option, the signature can also be added on
the web server itself. The proposed separation is based on
the requirement that this system must have access to the
private key, which should be kept secret.
After the signature is appended to the response, it is sent
further upstream where it is routed through transit zones
(for example the internet) until it eventually reaches the
browser of the requesting client. The service worker 4 then
intercepts all incoming requests and checks if the HTTP
header contains a valid signature. The service worker can
check the integrity of the web content by using the public key
of the web server. In our example the public key is enrolled
together with the service worker. In case of a valid signature
the service worker forwards the response to the browsers
user interface. In case of an invalid signature, domain specific
steps can be taken. Such steps are further discussed in Section
6.1.
As soon as the service worker starts working, we can as-
sume that all delivered web content was not tampered by
an active man-in-the-middle. Moreover, to prevent a passive
man-in-the-middle we can encrypt all sensitive web content
in JavaScript. To put it another way, the service worker en-
sures that our JavaScript code is unchanged and JavaScript
encryption protects against eavesdropping. In conclusion,
active and passive man-in-the-middle attacks are no longer
feasible, under the assumption that we can securely deliver
a service worker.
6 IMPLEMENTATION EXAMPLE
As proof of concept, an example implementation of the de-
scribed concept was developed. Within this section we dis-
cuss details and problems of the example implementation.
The example will focus on how the signing process can be
implemented with standard cryptographic functions and
which measures can be taken in case of invalid signatures.
Furthermore, in Section 6.3 possible replay attack protection
mechanism are shown.
Within the install event the public-keys of the server are
loaded into the service worker. As the install event is only
executed once, it pins the authentication mechanism to a
certain set of keys that remain constant for the lifetime of
the service worker. This is done for simplicity to explain
the idea behind the integrity validation. Other PKI solutions
can be established. After all is set up, the waiting stage is
skipped in order to replace a possibly active predecessor.
When the activate event is triggered, the scope of the website
gets immediately claimed, so upcoming requests will flow
through the service worker.
As soon as a fetch event is caught, the essential part of
the our solution takes place: the integrity validation. For this
operation, the original requests from the client browser are
forwarded to the web server and its response is awaited. In
order to enable the service worker to detect data manipu-
lations, we utilize regular digital signatures (e.g., ECDSA)
and embed them in every HTTP response header from the
web server. The service worker will validate all responses
by generating the hash digest (SHA-256) of the received re-
sponse body and check if it matches with the cryptographic
signature in the header. Only if this check succeeds, will
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it forward the response to the regular part of the browser,
which will then process and display this response in the
DOM. If the signature is invalid or not present, the response
will be discarded and an error message is returned to the
users DOM instead.
6.1 Incident Handling
Once the service worker receives content with an invalid
signature, a way to deal with it is to discard the received
response. This however will help neither the user nor the
service provider to detect an ongoing attack. For the user
it will just look as if they have a connection problem to the
server and the service provider will not know that something
went wrong. It is up to the service worker developer to decide
which steps are taken when a invalid signature is found.
For our examplewe implemented the following three steps,
which allow the user and the service worker to get informed:
Client Session Termination: If an incident is detected by
the service worker, it can terminate the user’s session on the
client side. This can be done by deleting or overwriting a
session cookie that keeps the user logged in.
Client Visual Warning: A service worker can inform the
user about the reason why the session was terminated. In
any case such an incident is not something the user should
have to deal with solely by themselves. A visual warning
can include the telephone number or e-mail address of the
service provider for incident reporting.
Incident Reporting: The service provider should be notified.
If the provider can detect an accumulation of incidents they
ideally can take targeted actions against the presumed attack.
A question that arises in this scenario is the following: If the
service worker detects manipulations despite an allegedly
secure TLS connection, how can the service provider get in-
formed about this without having the attacker just dropping
this alert on the insecure HTTPS channel?
This depends on the location of the attacker. If they control
all network traffic from the client to the Internet, one can
not prevented them from filtering such an alert message.
Nevertheless, if they just control a single connection (e.g.,
if they hijacked the web server or an upstream system in
the data center) the service worker can try to send an alert
message to another server with a different domain name
(or multiple in various locations). It’s assumed unlikely that
an attacker can intercept TLS traffic from more than one
certificate authority.
6.2 Validating the Service Worker
If a service worker is installed for a certain domain (or a
scope to be precise), it can intercept and validate all requests
and responses related to this domain. The request for fetch-
ing the service worker itself is handled differently internally
in the browser. Instead of yielding a fetch event, which can
be intercepted by the service worker, a separate channel is
used which is invisible to the running service worker. This
means, that if an attacker, holding a man-in-the-middle posi-
tion, delivers a compromised service worker to the browser
(e.g., one that just deems all unsigned content as valid), the
running service worker is not able to prevent the modified
service worker from getting installed. Nevertheless, as the
browser checks for an updated service worker only when the
rest of the webpage is loaded, it is possible to fetch a copy
of the service worker through the genuine active service
worker before the update within the browser. This means
that even if an attacker is able to modify the service worker
itself, a manipulation is detected and can invoke the incident
handling routine. Service workers cannot be prevented from
updating, but even in this case an attack can still be detected
and incidents routines can be executed.
Another key thing to remember is that a service worker
stays within the browser as long as there is no update or
the user clears the browser cache. This means that a service
worker can actively protect all the web content over months
or even years. Additionally, several service workers can be
active in parallel which allows to take incident handling
actions based on specific scopes like sub-domains.
6.3 Replay Attack Protection
With the presented approach an attacker is not able to ar-
bitrarily forge an HTTP response that will be accepted as
valid by the service worker. Nevertheless, without taking
additional measures, an attacker can collect and record valid
responses and just send them to the user. Depending on the
application, this may trick a user into the execution of unin-
tended actions when presented with old, replayed dynamic
content. For static content this can mean that an attacker
can send vulnerable versions of them, which have already
been fixed by the developers (e.g., a vulnerable processing
routine in JavaScript or an HTML with embedded elements,
pointing to malicious content).
To solve this problem for dynamic content, a timestamp
which is also sent in the HTTP header, gets pre- or appended
to the response body, before hashing it for the digital sig-
nature. Depending on the nature of the web application all
content older than a certain number of seconds can be dis-
carded, even when bearing an otherwise valid signature.
Although modern signature algorithms should be resilient
against Chosen Message Attacks (CMAs), this approach pro-
vides additional protection. As the message part chosen by
the server will only change every second in a common times-
tamp, it is possible to concatenate some bytes of random data
to the timestamp to make it unique and therefore prevent
CMAs.
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The situation for static content is a bit different: As static
content may be cached and does not get signed freshly every
time it is sent out, a time-based validation is impractical.
Instead of a timestamp it is possible to include for example a
build version number into the digital signature. The service
worker can then keep track of the highest version number
it has registered for static content yet, and discard all re-
sponses which arrive with a lower version number than that.
This would be an additional security measure that could be
configured if necessary.
6.4 Content Delivery Networks
For scalability reasons a service provider might want to make
use of third party content delivery networks to enhance the
performance of the web application. This is possible with
service worker and can be done in various ways, depending
on the type of CDN.
CDNs that act as dynamic proxy and cache will work
out of the box. They will just forward all content with the
appropriate headers and replay until the cache-control: max-
age runs out. In case of key changes, a versioning scheme in
the URLs will prevent clients from requesting content signed
with expired keys.
CDNs that deliver only predeployed static content are
not able to deliver the appropriate HTTP headers for our
approach. This is especially true for publicly hosted multi-
purpose content like common JavaScript libraries. In this
case it is possible to use subresource integrity [4, 16]. Where
subresource integrity is not an option, the service provider
can preload the service worker with a list of static file URLs
and their appropriate signatures.
7 EVALUATION
To evaluate whether our approach works as expected, we
implemented a prototype system and performed a series
of test covering the attack scenarios described in Section
3. Our test setup consisted of three components. The first
component was a client with Google Chrome 75 and Mozilla
Firefox 67. These two browsers were used to send 10’000
requests per test to the server. The second component was
a web server with a node based web page with static (CSS,
HTML, image assets) and dynamic content (JavaScripts).
The third component was a proxy that could intercept and
manipulate the requests and responses from the client and
server.
In order to simulate man-in-the-middle attacks with a
rouge certificate, we installed a self-signed CA certificate on
the client and server, issued and installed a corresponding
server certificate on the server, and made the server certifi-
cate and the corresponding private key available to the proxy.
To simulate attacks, the proxy was configured to intercept
and modify server responses at defined rates from 0% to 100%
by applying random sampling.
The test for a given rate consisted of sending 10’000 re-
quests per browser to the server and was considered success-
ful if the service workers could identify all manipulated files
without false positives.
8 RESULTS
These are the results of the evaluation with regard to the
three attack scenarios described in Section 3:
Scenario (A): No tests were carried out for this scenario
as our approach cannot defend against man-in-the-middle
attacks when the client has never visited the web page be-
fore. In this case, the service worker is not registered to the
scope yet and no trust relationship is established. This is a
limitation of all TOFU-based approaches.
Scenario (B): In this scenario, the client has visited the
domain once to install the service worker. For all of the tests
we set the interception rates between 1% and 100%, with
increasing steps of one percent: the service worker was able
to detect all of the manipulated files with no false positives.
Scenario (C): In this scenario, the client had already an
active TLS session to the web server after installing the ser-
vice worker on its initial visit to the web server. As with
scenario (B), for all of the tests we set the interception rates
between 1% and 100%, with increasing steps of one percent:
the service worker was able to detect all of the manipulated
files with no false positives.
9 LIMITATIONS
Within this section we discuss some of the mentioned limi-
tations as well as future work of our approach.
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9.1 Trust On First Use
A service worker needs first to be installed before it can ac-
tively secure the communication. In other words, no attacks
can be mitigated before a benign service worker has been in-
stalled in the client‘s browser.When providing awebsite with
a service requiring high security standards (e.g., e-banking or
sensitive document management), we can assume that most
users are regular users. Therefore chances that most users
will have a genuine service worker installed over time and
can profit from the enhanced protection are high. However,
compared to other techniques a TOFU approach may not be
an appropriate security standard for all use-cases and does
not mitigate all possible attack vectors. The TOFU problem
in enterprise environments may be avoided by supplying the
client with the secrets over a secure channel.
9.2 Key Management
Another attack vector is stealing the server’s private key.
In this case an attacker could bypass our security approach
and sign malicious content with the stolen key. In order to
mitigate the time window in which a stolen private key can
be used, it is recommended to exchange the key material
on a regular basis. This means that service workers must be
able to handle these key updates.
Our approach so far only mentions the use of one key
pair. Using only one key pair is problematic since already
installed service workers do not get the new key material
until they are updated. So when the server starts signing the
content with a new key all active service workers could no
longer validate the integrity of the content, until the new
public key is distributed to them. To prevent this drawback
a key rotation or other PKI solutions can be used.
Instead of placing one public keywithin the serviceworker,
two or more public keys can be placed. This means that the
service worker validates the signatures against a set of pub-
lic keys, allowing the server to change the signing key on
a regular basis without interrupting active service workers.
The server just needs to rotate to the next private key and
can replace deprecated public keys in the patched service
worker (see Section 9.2).
9.3 Processing cost on the server
The further costs to add another security layer to the TLS
traffic consist of an additional hash- and sign-operation. Com-
prehensive performance tests with real traffic have yet to
be run. A recent benchmark [18] conducted using OpenSSL
1.1.1 provides an approximation to the additional costs on
top of TLS traffic arising in a production environment: The
extra time needed to secure a message of 1 KB was measured
to be 3.78 ns to compute the hash (SHA-256) and 0.44 𝜇s to
sign it (ECDSA P-256) using a certain reference hardware2.
The results presented in Section 8 can be further improved
by including the logic for adding the integrity validation in-
formation to the WAF solutions. We expect this measure to
also reduce processing time. On the client side, preliminary
tests in our testing environment show no subjective notice-
able delay in loading or using web applications augmented
with our approach3. This is because all of the critical routines
doing the heavy lifting are built-in by modern browsers and
run at native speed (i.e., the Fetch API [16] and the Web
Crypto API [17]). In the future, we will perform broader and
more systematic tests in real-life scenarios to get realistic
numbers on the introduced overhead.
10 CONCLUSION
We illustrated challenges on securing web applications with
TLS and additional client-side security layers written in
JavaScript. We introduced service workers and presented
a novel approach to detect manipulated web application con-
tent utilizing them. We demonstrated how this approach
protects web application users from passive and active man-
in-the-middle attacks. Furthermore, we introduced a ser-
vice worker based signing scheme, which safeguards users
against malicious content coming from a compromised TLS
connection. We built a proof of concept implementation of
this scheme and evaluated our approach against an assumed
attack scenario.
It was described how service worker can be used for an
additional security measurement in order to protect web
content delivery. The approach described in Section 5, uses
public key cryptography and a custom HTTP headerto guar-
antee the integrity of JavaScript files under some circum-
stances. Depending on the attack scenario one wants to pre-
vent, service workers are a legit method to detect and defend
against man-in-the-middle attacks. Despite the fact that ser-
vice workers rely on a trust on first use approach they can be
an additional line of defence.
As shown service worker in combination with other se-
curity standard like CT can be especially useful when an
attacker manages to issue rogue certificates. In such a case
attackers would not only have to manage to issue a rogue
certificate unnoticed, but also to replace all service workers
on different scopes without breaking the web-applications,
which can not go undetected as described in Section 6.2.
All things considered, the approach shows that once a
service worker is working on a domain it can be used to
2AWS t2.2xlarge instances with 8 vCPUs from an E5–2686 v4 CPU at
2.30GHz running Ubuntu 16.04 with kernel 4.4.0
3Using browsers based on Chromium 75 and Firefox 67.
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detect and mitigate ongoing man-in-the-middle attacks. Fur-
thermore, the integrity validation of web content files with
service workers allow to implement an additional layer of
encryption within JavaScript. This encryption layer allows
to defend against eavesdropping attacks, which gives the
service provider and users a new way of securing their com-
munication.
The concept of using service workers as additional secu-
rity measure to enhance TLS is not only limited to man-in-
the-middle attacks. Another key idea behind using service
workers is the detection of hacked web servers which de-
livery modified content. As mentioned in Section 5 service
workers are used for adding a HTTP header with a signature
to the web content. The system is considered secure as long
as the private key is kept secret. This concept could further
be enhanced with signing static (HTML, CSS, images etc.)
and dynamic (JavaScript) content with separate keys. Such a
separation could be done during the build process of a web
application. In the scenario that the private key of the web
server is stolen it would only allow an attacker to change
parts (dynamic content) of the web application and a service
worker could detect if the attacker attempts to change the
static content.
Overall service workers can be used as an additional se-
curity measurement to prevent man-in-the-middle attacks
but fail to fully secure a client from all possible attacks, due
to the browsers API limitations when it comes to handling
service worker updates and a TOFU problematic to deliver
the service worker.
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